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INTRODUCTION 
[1] The Hatch-Waxman Act provides a mandatory thirty-month stay 
on the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) approval of an Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (ANDA) when a patent infringement suit is filed.1  
The Act includes a provision for a district court to shorten or extend the 
Act’s thirty-month stay on FDA approval if “either party to the action 
failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action”2 (hereinafter “the 
modification provision”).  The federal district courts have on the whole 
been very conservative in their interpretation of the modification 
provision.3  The district courts have, to date, seldom exercised their power 
 
                                                                                                                         
∗
 J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 2009; B.S., Georgetown University, 2006. 
1
 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006). 
2
 Id. 
3
 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 557 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (Prost, J., dissenting); Gerald Sobel et al., Hatch-Waxman Litigation from the 
Perspective of Pioneer Pharmaceutical Companies, in PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES 
HANDBOOK 183, 197 (Barry L. Grossman & Gary M. Hoffman eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
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to alter the obligatory thirty-month stay.4  In a recent case, Eli Lilly v. 
Teva, the Federal Circuit held that a district court’s decision to modify the 
statutory thirty-month stay is within the discretionary powers of that 
particular district court, may be based on a party’s uncooperative 
discovery practices before the court, and will only be reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion.5  In the wake of the Eli Lilly decision, it is now likely 
that the modification provision will become more liberally interpreted and 
frequently invoked by some of the district courts. 
[2] Part I of this article provides an introduction to the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, the legislative history of the modification provision, and some 
discussion on the market incentives that pioneer pharmaceutical 
companies have to extend the statutory thirty-month stay.  Part II covers 
the facts of the Eli Lilly v. Teva decision, a case in which the Southern 
District of Indiana used the modification provision to prevent the generic 
defendant Teva from launching its ANDA product to compete with Eli 
Lilly’s Evista product before the start of the parties’ trial.  Part III of this 
article surveys other district court decisions concerning the modification 
provision.  The goal of Part III is to provide a foundational understanding 
of the prior judicial understanding of the modification provision.  
Accordingly, all of the decisions in Part III were made prior to the Federal 
Circuit’s Eli Lilly v. Teva decision.  Part IV of this article discusses the 
legal significance of the Eli Lilly v. Teva decision and argues that the 
Federal Circuit’s decision was inadequate.  Part V of this article concludes 
that the Federal Circuit’s deceptively simple Eli Lilly v. Teva decision is a 
harbinger with substantial ramifications for Hatch-Waxman jurisprudence. 
I.  INTRODUCTION TO THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT 
[3] In 1984 Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act (commonly known as the “Hatch-Waxman Act”).6  
 
                                                                                                                         
4
 See id. 
5
 Eli Lilly, 557 F.3d at 1348–51. 
6
 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 
U.S.C.). 
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The goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to balance protections for 
patented pharmaceutical drugs with improved market access for less 
expensive generic drugs.7   
[4] Prior to enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturers had to file full New Drug Applications 
(NDA), which required the generic manufacturer to perform the same 
intensive clinical trials that pioneer pharmaceutical manufacturers 
complete, in order to receive FDA approval to market a new generic drug.8  
Generic drug manufacturers also had to wait until the pioneer drug patents 
expired before they could begin the time-consuming NDA approval 
process.9  Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturers instead file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) 
certifying that the generic drug candidate is “bioequivalent” to the FDA 
approved pioneer drug product.10  The ANDA process allows a generic 
manufacturer to use the drug safety and effectiveness studies that the 
pioneer manufacturer submitted for its NDA.11  A generic manufacturer is 
 
                                                                                                                         
7
 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 
2647–48; WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE 
HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING PHARMACEUTICAL 
PATENTS (2004); see also Frederick Tong, Comment, Widening the Bottleneck of 
Pharmaceutical Patent Exclusivity, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 775, 804 (2003) (“Although 
this compromise has been an uneasy partnership for all parties involved, both sides have 
profited enormously.”). 
8
 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2649 
(“Prior to 1962, . . . all drugs [must have been] approved as safe before they could be 
marketed.”). 
9
 See, e.g., Holly Soehnge, Note, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984: Fine-Tuning the Balance Between the Interests of Pioneer and 
Generic Drug Manufacturers, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 51, 51 (2003) (citing H.R. REP. 
NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647–48). 
10
 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., What are Generic Drugs? (2009), http://www.fda.gov/ 
Drugs/ResearchForYou/Consumers/BuyingMedicineSafely/UnderstandingGenericDrugs/
ucml44456.htm. 
11
 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 557 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)). 
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also permitted to file an ANDA before the patents for a pioneer drug 
expire and to receive FDA approval to market its generic drug upon either 
the expiration of  all applicable pioneer drug patents or upon a judicial 
determination that the pioneer drug’s patents are invalid or not infringed 
by the generic’s “bioequivalent” product.12 
[5] Upon filing an NDA, a pioneer drug manufacturer is required to 
list the patents that claim its drug product.13  If the NDA receives 
approval, the FDA publishes a listing of the drug and its applicable patents 
in the publication Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations (commonly known as the “Orange Book”).14  In an ANDA, 
the generic manufacturer is required to include a statement with one of 
four different certifications (known as “paragraph certifications”) with 
respect to each patent listed in the Orange Book for the “bioequivalent” 
NDA product.15  The four possible paragraph certifications are: 
(i) that such patent information has not been filed,  
(ii) that such patent has expired,  
(iii) [that the generic does not seek to enter the market 
until] the date on which such patent will expire, or  
 
                                                                                                                         
12
 See generally id. at 1348–49; Sobel et al., supra note 3, at 184–85. 
13
 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.53(a)–(b)(1) (2009); see also Stephanie Greene, A Prescription for 
Change: How the Medicare Act Revises Hatch-Waxman To Speed Market Entry of 
Generic Drugs, 30 J. CORP. L. 309, 316 (2005). 
14
 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC 
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS iv (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf.  The FDA does not evaluate the 
strength or validity of patents in the Orange Book.  See id. 
15
 See, e.g., Steven J. Lee et al., Waxman-Hatch Litigation from the Perspective of the 
Generic Pharmaceutical Industry, in PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES HANDBOOK, supra 
note 3, at 149, 152–53. 
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(iv) that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by 
the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the 
application is submitted.16 
When an ANDA includes a paragraph IV certification that a patent is 
invalid or will not be infringed by the ANDA product, the ANDA filer 
must notify the NDA holder to provide the NDA holder with an 
opportunity to file a patent infringement action.17 
[6] A paragraph IV certification creates an artificial act of patent 
infringement.18  Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a pioneer pharmaceutical 
company has forty-five days from the receipt of a paragraph IV notice in 
which to file an infringement suit.19  If the pioneer manufacturer brings a 
patent infringement action against the ANDA filer within the forty-five 
day window, the statutory thirty-month stay on the FDA’s approval of the 
ANDA product immediately takes effect.20  The statutory stay lasts for 
either thirty months or until the date that the infringement suit is resolved, 
whichever occurs first.21  The generic ANDA filer is barred from bringing 
a declaratory judgment action against the patent holders, typically the 
pioneer manufacturer, during the forty-five day notice window.22  If the 
pioneer manufacturer does not file an infringement action within forty-five 
days of receipt, the FDA may approve the ANDA.23  A pioneer 
manufacturer may still bring an infringement action against the ANDA 
 
                                                                                                                         
16
 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
17
 Id. § 355(b)(3)(C). 
18
 See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); cf. Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1351 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)). 
19
 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
20
 See id. §§ 355(c)(3)(C), (j)(5)(B)(iii). 
21
 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
22
 Id. § 355(c)(3)(D)(i)(I)(aa). 
23
 See id. § 355(c)(3)(C). 
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filer after the forty-five day period has elapsed, but filing suit at that time 
will no longer impose a stay on the FDA’s approval or prevent the market 
entry of the ANDA product.24  Suffice it to say, it is very rare that an NDA 
holder will not file an infringement action within the forty-five day 
window in order to secure the automatic thirty-month stay.25 
1.  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE THIRTY-MONTH STAY 
[7] The reason Congress chose to make thirty months the length of the 
statutory Hatch-Waxman stay remains unknown.26  The Hatch-Waxman 
Act and its subsequent amendments were heavily lobbied.27  “The 
legislative history indicates that the thirty-month stay was a hard-won 
compromise between brand-name manufacturers, generics manufacturers, 
and other stakeholders.”28  On the one hand, because the provisions of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act were so heavily disputed, the legislative intent behind 
 
                                                                                                                         
24
 See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
25
 See Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by 
Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS 
L.J. 171, 177–78 (2008) (“The purpose of the thirty-month stay is to protect NDA 
holders with valid drug patents.”). 
26
 See, e.g., Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on 
the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999) (“There is a 
paucity of legislative history on the Hatch-Waxman Act.”). 
27
 See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 tit. XI, 
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i) 
and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5)).  The pioneer pharmaceutical industry was the leading 
industry campaign contributor in the 2002 election year, prior to the enactment of the 
2003 Amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act.  The generic drug industry, which did not 
lag far behind, was one of the top ten industry campaign contributors that year.  See, e.g., 
Center for Responsive Politics, Pharmaceuticals/Health Products: Long-Term 
Contribution Trends, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=H04 (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2009). 
28
 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 557 F.3d 1346, 1354 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(Prost, J., dissenting). 
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specific provisions of the Act is often unclear.29  On the other hand, there 
is strong evidence in the legislative history that, in creating a thirty-month 
stay, Congress intended for generic drug manufacturers to have the 
opportunity to launch their product at-risk in the later stages of most 
infringement trials.30 
[8] The only legislative history on the modification provision is a 
statement in the House Report: “Each party to a patent infringement suit is 
charged to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action.  Failure by either 
party to cooperate in a reasonable manner may be used by the court to 
reduce or lengthen the time, as appropriate, before an ANDA approval 
becomes effective.”31  The House version of the bill originally provided 
for an FDA stay of only eighteen months.32  The House Report cites 
findings that the median time between filing and disposition of a patent 
suit was thirty-six months, and that ten percent of cases take more than 
seventy-seven months.33  The House Report contains language that a 
proposed amendment that would stay FDA approval until after a court 
 
                                                                                                                         
29
 For example, the Supreme Court has stated: “No interpretation we have been able to 
imagine could transform § 271(e)(1) into an elegant piece of statutory draftsmanship.  To 
construe it as the Court of Appeals decided, one must posit a good deal of legislative 
imprecision . . . .”  Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990) (deciding 
that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision, which assumed legislative 
imprecision, was the best statutory interpretation available); see also Mossinghoff, supra 
note 27. 
30
 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 10 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 
2694.  An at-risk launch means that the generic manufacturer will be liable for damages if 
it proceeds to market its product and the court subsequently finds the patent valid and 
infringed.  See generally Sobel et al., supra note 3, at 198–99. 
31
 Id. at 16, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2700. 
32
 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, H.R. 3605, 98th 
Cong. § 101 (1984); H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 9–10 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2693-94 (“This [eighteen-month] provision was added by the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce to accommodate the competing concerns of the 
PMA and the generic manufacturers. . . .  The generic manufacturers . . . were willing to 
live with an eighteen-month rule because of other provisions of the bill.”). 
33
 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 10, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2694. 
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verdict of invalidity was inadvisable because it would “substantially delay 
generics from getting onto the market” and potentially discourage generics 
from challenging the validity of a pioneer drug patent.34  The House 
Report further states that such an amendment was unnecessary because a 
patent holder can recover damages if the generic manufacturer launches an 
infringing product after the FDA stay expires.35   
[9] The House Report strongly suggests that provision of the statutory 
stay was not done solely to delay generic market entry and that the stay 
was not intended to last through most infringement trials.36  The House 
arguably designed the stay to encourage pioneer manufacturers to pursue a 
speedy trial resolution. 
[10] In the end, it was the Senate’s proposal for a thirty-month stay that 
triumphed.37  But it is important to note that even the thirty-month stay 
was still six months less than the congressional finding for the median 
length of a patent infringement suit.38  The takeaway message is that: 
 It is important to remember that the purpose of the 
thirty-month stay is not necessarily to extend the patent 
holder’s monopoly, but to create an adequate window of 
time during which to litigate the question of whether a 
generic will infringe the patented product, without actually 
having to introduce the generic product to the market.39 
 
                                                                                                                         
34
 Id. 
35
 Id. 
36
 See id. at 9–10, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2693–94. 
37
 See, e.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, S. 2926, 
98th Cong. § 101 (1984). 
38
 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 10, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2694. 
39
 Ben Venue Labs., Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 572, 579 (D.N.J. 
2001) (citing to Senator Hatch’s and Representative Waxman’s statements in the 
Congressional Record). 
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While it is not fully clear why Congress chose a period of thirty months or 
why it included the modification provision in the Hatch-Waxman Act, the 
legislative history reveals that the thirty-month stay was not intended to 
function purely as a mechanism for preventing generic market entry 
during an infringement lawsuit, but rather was created as an integral part 
of a larger statutory scheme aimed at promoting generic market entry.40  In 
settling on a thirty-month stay and including the modification provision, 
Congress most likely sought to balance a fair period of time for 
conducting a trial without the risk of generic market entry against an 
appreciation of the risk that too long of a statutory stay period would 
create incentives for parties to unnecessarily delay the trial date until the 
end of the stay period.41 
2.  PIONEER MANUFACTURER INCENTIVES FOR DELAY 
[11] The statutory thirty-month stay is of tremendous financial value to 
pioneer pharmaceutical companies.42  During the statutory stay period, a 
pioneer manufacturer remains in complete control of the product market 
regardless of the strength of its patents.43  Because there is always some 
risk of losing at trial, a pioneer manufacturer does not want to hold trial 
until the end of the thirty-month statutory stay period.  A pioneer 
pharmaceutical company has strong market incentives to extend the thirty-
 
                                                                                                                         
40
 See Narinder S. Banait, Antitrust Issues and the Hatch-Waxman Act, IPFRONTLINE, 
Nov. 11, 2005, http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=7181&deptid=4. 
41
 Because the statutory stay period also terminates on the date that a court finds the 
patent invalid or not infringed, generic manufacturers (usually) have strong interests in 
pursuing quick lawsuits.  See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 16, at 162. 
42
 See Robert E. Colletti, The Role of the Food and Drug Attorney in Hatch-Waxman 
Lawsuits, in Inside the Minds: Food and Drug Law Settlements and Negotiations (2006), 
available at http://www.flhlaw.com/files/Publication/bcc5610d-419a-4ee2-b46a-
293235ebd8e5/Preview/PublicationAttachment/dd3abe66-7e12-4c62-8e23-2a9ef2bb3503 
/CollettiBookChapter . pdf.   
43
 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN 
FTC STUDY 14 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf. 
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month statutory stay, or further delay generic market entry by any means 
possible.44 
[12] Prior to the 2003 Hatch-Waxman Amendments, pioneer 
pharmaceutical companies were able to secure more than one statutory 
stay for the same drug product.45  Companies accomplished this by listing 
a new patent in the Orange Book after the first thirty-month stay against 
the generic defendant became effective.46  One example of this type of 
behavior occurred in Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp.47  In 
Andrx, the pioneer manufacturer Biovail licensed a new patent, 
reformulated its drug product to fall within this new patent, and listed the 
new patent in the Orange Book for its drug after the generic defendant 
Andrx was successful at trial against the pioneer’s primary drug patent.48  
This newly listed patent resulted in a second infringement trial with 
another thirty-month statutory stay against the defendant’s ANDA 
product.49  The second trial was assigned to the same district court judge, 
William P. Dimitrouleas, who had heard the first trial.50  Dimitrouleas 
used the modification provision to shorten the second statutory stay.51  On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the district court’s 
 
                                                                                                                         
44
 See Sarah E. Eurek, Hatch-Waxman Reform and Accelerated Market Entry of Generic 
Drugs: Is Faster Necessarily Better?, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, ¶¶ 4–5, 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/ dltr/articles/pdf/2003DLTR0018.pdf. 
45
 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 44, at iii. 
46
 Id. 
47
 175 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2001), vacated, 276 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
Andrx is the only case other than Eli Lilly v. Teva in which the Federal Circuit has 
considered the modification provision. 
48
 See id. at 1365–66. 
49
 See id. at 1365, 1367. 
50
 See id. at 1365; Biovail Corp. Int’l v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1320 
(S.D. Fla. 2000). 
51
 See Andrx, 276 F.3d at 1375–76. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology  Volume XVI, Issue 2 
11 
decision to use the modification provision must be based on behavior 
before the court, not on behavior before the FDA.52 
[13] The outcome in Andrx provided a strong stimulus for the 2003 
Amendments.  Under the 2003 Amendments, a pioneer manufacturer is 
now limited to only one statutory thirty-month stay per ANDA.53  While a 
pioneer pharmaceutical manufacturer may sue a generic manufacturer 
under a later listed patent, the pioneer manufacturer is not eligible to 
receive any additional stay on the FDA approval of an ANDA for patents 
listed after the ANDA is first filed.54 
[14] The additional statutory stay in Andrx is but one example of the 
ways in which pioneer pharmaceutical companies have become very 
skillful at advantageously using the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
to keep generic competition off the market.55  As one commenter has 
stated: “The Hatch-Waxman Amendments increased generic drug entry in 
the market, but they were also vulnerable to abuse by brand-name 
manufacturers.  The terms of the original Hatch-Waxman Amendments 
 
                                                                                                                         
52
 See id. 
53
 See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. 
L. No. 108-173, § 1101, 117 Stat. 2066, 2448–57 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006)). 
54
 See id. 
55
 See, e.g., Yana Pechersky, Note, To Achieve Closure of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s 
Loopholes, Legislative Action Is Unnecessary: Generic Manufacturers Are Able To Hold 
Their Own, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 775, 777 (2007) (“While this amendment 
eliminated the practice by brand name manufacturers of using a string of thirty-month 
stays to keep generic entrants off the market, it did not address the remaining 
loopholes.”); Beth Understahl, Note, Authorized Generics: Careful Balance Undone, 16 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 355, 378 (2005) (“The history of the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments clearly demonstrates that innovators will exploit loopholes in the 
statutory language to squeeze out as much market share as possible when faced with 
generic competition.”); see also Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the 
Hatch-Waxman Scheme on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 175–203 (2005). 
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created incentives for anticompetitive behavior.” 56  Current examples of 
pioneer manufacturer tactics to delay generic market entry include 
frivolous claims of patent infringement,57 authorized generics,58 and 
collusive settlements between pioneers and generic companies.59 
[15] According to another commenter: “The goals of the Act . . . are 
threatened by clever market players who find ways to avoid the give-and-
take required to make the Act work.”60  With its current broad and highly 
deferential reading of the modification provision, the Federal Circuit has 
created a new area of uncertainty in the Act that pioneer companies can 
exploit to their advantage in delaying generic market entry. 
 
                                                                                                                         
56
 Understahl, supra note 55, at 367–68. 
57
 When the primary patent(s) are set to expire, a manufacturer will often list, and then 
file suit under, new patents that have little to do with the basic functioning of the drug 
product.  “Evergreening” is the practice of extending a patent monopoly by means of a 
later more peripheral patent.  See, e.g., Tong, supra note 6, at 788 (“While the practice of 
evergreening itself is legitimate, pioneer drug companies can abuse the system by 
patenting virtually every aspect of their drug, including product, process, use, formulation 
and even tablet shape.  By staggering every possible patentable aspect of the drug down 
to formulation and tablet size, the lifetime of a pioneer drug’s exclusive marketing can be 
significantly extended.”). 
58
 An authorized generic is a “generic” product manufactured by the pioneer 
manufacturer or its authorized licensee.  Authorized generics are legal, and entitled to 
share the market during the first ANDA filer’s 180-day exclusivity period.  Authorized 
generics may work to deter the market entry of generic ANDA products.  See generally 
Christopher S. Ponder, Comment, The Dubious Value of Hatch-Waxman Exclusivity, 45 
HOUS. L. REV. 555, 571–79 (2008) (assessing whether authorized generics are 
anticompetitive). 
59
 See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1568 (2006). 
60
 Kristin E. Behrendt, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Balancing Competing Interests or 
Survival of the Fittest?, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 270 (2002). 
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II.  THE FACTS OF ELI LILLY & CO. V. TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.61 
[16] Eli Lilly and Company sells raloxifene hydrochloride under the 
brand name Evista.62  Evista is approved for treatment of postmenopausal 
osteoporosis and prevention of breast cancer.63  On May 16, 2006, Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA notified Eli Lilly that it had filed an ANDA with 
paragraph IV certifications for raloxifene.64  Eli Lilly subsequently filed 
suit on June 29, 2006, in the Southern District of Indiana, alleging that 
Teva infringed four of the twelve patents listed in the Orange Book for 
Evista.65  The statutory thirty-month stay against approval of Teva’s 
ANDA was immediately effective and would expire on November 16, 
2008.66  The district court entered a scheduling order with a discovery 
deadline of August 18, 2008, and a trial date of March 9, 2009.67  During 
discovery, Teva first provided Eli Lilly with samples of its proposed 
ANDA product.68  In February 2007, Eli Lilly amended its complaint to 
 
                                                                                                                         
61
 See Case History Timeline infra Addendum (supplementing facts of Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-1017, 2008 WL 4809963, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 
2008)) [hereinafter Case History Timeline for Eli Lilly v. Teva]. 
62
 See id. 
63
 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Electronic Orange Book, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2009) 
(searching by proprietary name “Evista”). 
64
 See Case History Timeline for Eli Lilly v. Teva, supra note 61. 
65
 See id.  By the date of the infringement trial, there were sixteen patents listed in the 
Orange Book for Evista.  See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Electronic Orange 
Book, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 
2009) (searching by proprietary name “Evista”). 
66
 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-1017, 2008 WL 4809963, 
at *1 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2008). 
67
 See id. at *1 & n.2. 
68
 See Corrected Non-Confidential Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Eli Lilly & Co. at 3–6, Eli 
Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2009-1071 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22, 2008), 2008 
WL 5550616 [hereinafter Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee]. 
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assert Teva infringed three additional patents covering Evista’s particle 
size and formulation.69 
[17] On July 8, 2008, Teva amended its ANDA with the FDA to 
include a new particle size measuring methodology for the active 
pharmaceutical ingredient in its proposed raloxifene tablets.70  Two days 
later, Teva informed Eli Lilly of this amendment.71  Teva provided three 
batch samples of its amended ANDA product to Eli Lilly, the first on July 
28, 2008, the second on August 19, 2008, and the third on September 17, 
2008.72  From July through September 2008, Teva provided Eli Lilly with 
27,000 pages of documentation related to its new particle size measuring 
methodology.73  It is important to note that Teva delivered two of the 
batch sample products and produced some of the related documents after 
the August 18, 2008 discovery deadline, which was set almost two years 
earlier, in September 2006.74 
[18] Eli Lilly subsequently filed a motion in September 2008 requesting 
that the Southern District of Indiana extend the statutory thirty-month 
FDA stay on approval of Teva’s ANDA.75  Judge Sarah Evans Barker 
granted Eli Lilly’s motion to extend the stay until the start of trial on 
March 9, 2009, a period of approximately four months after the scheduled 
thirty-month expiration date of the stay.76  Evista had $1.076 billion in 
 
                                                                                                                         
69
 See id.; see generally Complaint, Eli Lilly, 2009 WL 3060227 (No. 1:06-CV-1017). 
70
 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 68, at 6–13. 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id. 
74
 See id. at 6–13, 25–29. 
75
 Id. at 13–17. 
76
 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-1017, 2008 WL 4809963, at 
*2 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2008).  On October 6, 2008, Eli Lilly also filed motions for a 
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sales for 2008.77  Accordingly, the decision to extend the FDA stay 
approximately four months was potentially worth hundreds of millions of 
dollars to Eli Lilly. 
[19] The basis for the decision by Judge Barker to extend the statutory 
FDA stay against Teva deserves attention for a couple of reasons.  First, 
under the 2003 Hatch-Waxman Amendments, Eli Lilly was not entitled to 
a second statutory stay for the four patents it added to its complaint in 
February 2007.78  Teva’s FDA amendment and belated product and 
document production all related to these later added patents.  Second, 
under Andrx, the district court could not consider Teva’s ANDA 
amendment—legitimate conduct before the FDA—in its determination of 
whether Teva “failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action.”79  
Therefore, the fact that Teva engaged in discovery production after the 
discovery deadline is the only logical basis the district court could use to 
support a finding that Teva had “failed to reasonably cooperate in 
expediting the action” and, consequently, extend the statutory FDA stay 
against Teva’s ANDA.80  The district court’s opinion prominently relied 
on Eli Lilly’s arguments that Teva had “failed to reasonably cooperate in 
the action” by submitting some of its new product samples and related 
documentation after the August 18, 2008 discovery deadline.81  But the 
 
                                                                                                                         
temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction to prevent Teva from 
launching its product on or after the November 16, 2008 expiration of the stay.  See id. at 
*2 n.5. 
77
 Press Release, Eli Lilly & Co., Lilly Reports Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2008 
Results (Jan. 29, 2009), available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/LLY/ 
589013876x0x268802/086c5a30-2bfb-4353-8e81-be50b8f17b19/ LLY_News_2009_ 
1_29_Financial.pdf. 
78
 Non-Confidential Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. at 1–4, 
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2009-1071 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 30, 2008), 
2008 WL 5550617 [hereinafter Brief of Defendant-Appellant]. 
79
 See Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1370–80 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
80
 Eli Lilly, 2008 WL 4809963, at *1–2. 
81
 See id. 
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district court never stated that Teva’s discovery delays were severe enough 
to satisfy the statutory requirement: “fail[ure] to reasonably cooperate in 
expediting the action.”82  Instead, the district court’s conclusions 
supporting its ruling relied on evidence that Teva’s behavior related to 
recasting its product caused Eli Lilly to need more time to prepare for the 
trial.83 
[20] The most interesting fact of the case is that the originally 
scheduled March 9, 2009 trial date never moved.84  It is hard to connect a 
finding that the defendant’s behavior caused the pioneer plaintiff to need 
more time to prepare for trial with the solution of a stay on FDA 
approval—effectively a preliminary injunction—in the absence of a 
corresponding stay on the litigation.  While it is not necessary to alter the 
trial date to warrant use of the modification provision by the district court, 
there should have at least been a finding that the defendant’s behavior was 
on a level that would warrant staying the litigation.  Otherwise, the fact 
that there was no delay in the litigation suggests that the court was using 
the modification provision as a “punishment” mechanism for a discovery 
delay, instead of for its intended purpose.85 
[21] Because the statutory stay is equivalent to injunctive relief, the 
Federal Circuit took the Eli Lilly v. Teva case on interlocutory appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).86  On February 24, 2009, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the Southern District of Indiana’s decision to use the 
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 Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 78, at 1–4. 
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 See Eli Lilly, 2008 WL 4809963, at *2. 
84
 See id. 
85
 Henry Lebowitz, Remarks at Columbia Law School Advanced Patents Seminar (Apr. 
16, 2009). 
86
 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 557 F.3d 1346, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
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modification provision to extend the FDA stay against Teva’s ANDA until 
the start of the infringement trial.87 
III.  DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS CONCERNING THE MODIFICATION 
PROVISION PRIOR TO THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S RULING IN ELI LILLY V. TEVA 
[22] Prior to the Federal Circuit’s recent ruling, there have been nine 
district court decisions—other than Eli Lilly v. Teva—related to the 
modification provision.88  Moreover, excluding the Southern District of 
Indiana and the Southern District of Florida’s decision, which was 
overturned by the Federal Circuit in Andrx, only two district courts have 
been willing to exercise their power to modify the statutory thirty-month 
 
                                                                                                                         
87
 Id. at 1351.  Interestingly, on April 22, 2009, Judge Barker granted a renewed motion 
for preliminary injunction in favor of Eli Lilly.  The April 2009 preliminary injunction 
prevented Teva from launching its generic product until there was a final trial ruling on 
the merits of the infringement suit. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 609 
F.Supp.2d 786, 790-812 (S.D. Ind. 2009); see also Press Release, Eli Lilly & Co., Lilly 
Granted Preliminary Injunction to Prevent Launch of Generic Raloxifene (Apr. 22, 2009), 
available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/LLY/784741347x0x289245/ 
8d085039-0f56-4397-823a-45ad2ee83dc2/LLY_News_2009_4_22_Corporate.pdf.  The 
fact that Judge Barker later granted Eli Lilly a preliminary injunction supports this 
article’s argument that a preliminary injunction, and not the modification provision, was 
the more appropriate legal analysis for determining whether or not to prevent Teva from 
launching its generic raloxifene product at the time the original thirty-month FDA stay 
expired.    
88
 Based on an extensive search of Westlaw, LexisNexis, and the Stanford IP Litigation 
Clearinghouse website (available at http://lexmachina.stanford.edu).  See generally 
Glaxo, Inc. v. TorPharm, Inc., No. 95 C 4686, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12816 (N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 20, 1997); Zeneca Ltd. v. Pharmachemie B.V., 16 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Mass. 1998); 
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., No. IP 99-38-C H/G, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2728 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 8, 2001); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Alphapharm Party 
Ltd., No. Civ. 99-13 MJDLGL, 2002 WL 1299996 (D. Minn. Mar. 8, 2002); Andrx 
Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Novartis Corp. v. 
Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., No. 04 Civ. 0757 (SAS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21094 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2004); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., Cause No. 1:02-CV-1844-
SEB-VSS (S.D. Ind. May 27, 2005); Dey, L.P. v. Ivax Pharms., Inc., 233 F.R.D. 567 
(C.D. Cal. 2005); In re Brimonidine Patent Litig., No. 07-MD-1866, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 92405 (D. Del. Oct. 31, 2008). 
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stay under the modification provision.89  The Southern District of New 
York granted an extension of the thirty-month FDA stay against a generic 
defendant in conjunction with the generic defendant’s motion for a stay on 
the litigation.90  The Central District of California granted a request to 
shorten the thirty-month stay due to a pioneer plaintiff’s failure to identify 
and disclose the inventors of its patent.91 
[23] For the most part, the district courts have been reluctant to exercise 
their discretionary power under the modification provision.92  The 
Northern District of Illinois, the District of Massachusetts, the District of 
Minnesota, and the District of Delaware have each denied a motion to 
modify the statutory thirty-month FDA stay as not warranted.93  These 
courts have tended to recognize that some natural give-and-take exists in 
the discovery process, and have each concluded that the fact that a party 
has committed some delay does not mean that the party has necessarily 
“failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action.”94 
[24] The Southern District of Indiana is currently an outlier in how 
liberally it interprets the modification provision and how frequently it 
grants requests for modification of the statutory FDA stay.95  The Southern 
 
                                                                                                                         
89
 See Novartis Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21094; Dey, L.P. v. Eon Labs, Inc., No. 
SACV 04-00243 CJC (FMOx), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39475 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2005). 
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 Novartis Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21094, at *14–15. 
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 Eon Labs, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39475, at *2–3. 
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 As one commenter notes, this is “perhaps because courts have been unwilling to blame 
one party exclusively for failure to cooperate.”  David Bickart, The Hatch-Waxman Act, 
in DEVELOPMENTS IN PHARMACEUTICAL AND BIOTECH PATENT LAW 205, 247 (2008). 
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 Glaxo, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12816, at *23; Zeneca Ltd., 16 F. Supp. 2d at 113; 
Minn. Mining, 2002 WL 1299996, at *6; In re Brimonidine Patent Litig., 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 92405, at *13. 
94
 Minn. Mining, 2002 WL 1299996, at *2. 
95
 See generally Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., No. IP 99-38-C H/G, 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2728 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 8, 2001). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology  Volume XVI, Issue 2 
19 
District of Indiana has now granted motions to extend the statutory thirty-
month stay in three different cases, all of which have involved Eli Lilly 
and Company as the plaintiff and an alleged discovery failure against 
(what is now) three different generic defendants.96 
1.  GLAXO, INC. V. TORPHARM, INC. 
[25] In 1997, the Northern District of Illinois was the first court to rule 
on 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(B)(iii)’s modification provision.97  In the case, 
the generic defendant TorPharm sought to shorten the thirty-month 
statutory stay by five months.98  The Northern District of Illinois found 
that TorPharm’s contentions that pioneer manufacturer plaintiff Glaxo was 
still delivering requested discovery documents two months after the close 
of discovery and that TorPharm had needed to file four motions to compel 
in order to obtain documents that Glaxo had promised to produce in 
discovery responses were both true.99  The court nevertheless denied 
TorPharm’s request to shorten the stay.100 
[26] The Northern District of Illinois concluded that Glaxo’s discovery 
delays were not sufficient behavior to warrant shortening the statutory 
thirty-month stay.101  The district court’s “overall impression of this case 
during the discovery phase [was] that both parties conducted a tremendous 
amount of discovery within a relatively short period of time.”102  The court 
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 See generally Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 557 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 
2009); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., Cause No. 1:02-CV-1844-SEB-JMS (S.D. Ind. 
May 27, 2005); Zenith Goldline Pharms., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2728. 
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 See generally Glaxo, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12816. 
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 Id. at *5. 
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 Id. at *9. 
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 Id. at *10. 
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 Id. at *7–10. 
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 Id. at *8. 
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concluded that, even though “Glaxo was untimely in its document 
productions,” modification of the statutory stay was not appropriate 
because Glaxo had “nonetheless cooperated in moving along this 
litigation.”103  The Northern District of Illinois’s decision in Glaxo is 
interesting because, while failure to reasonably cooperate is admittedly a 
very factual determination, the decision is contrary to the conclusion 
reached by the district court in Eli Lilly v. Teva. 
2.  ZENECA LTD. V. PHARMACHEMIE B.V. 
[27] In 1998, the District of Massachusetts first considered a motion to 
extend the statutory thirty-month  FDA stay.104  The court denied the 
motion.105  The opinion simply states that 21 U.S.C. § 335(j)(5)(B)(iii) 
imposes an “affirmative duty [on the parties] to ‘reasonably cooperate in 
expediting the action’” and that “the record shows that the defendant has 
cooperated reasonably in expediting this action.”106  This decision is one 
of the only officially published district court decisions regarding the 
modification provision, but the opinion is too pithy to provide much in 
terms of worthwhile precedent. 
3.  ELI LILLY & CO. V. ZENITH GOLDLINE PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. 
[28] In 2001, the Southern District of Indiana was the first court to 
exercise its power under the modification provision.107  The court 
extended the statutory stay until entry of a final judgment in the 
infringement action.108  Interestingly, the case plaintiff, who filed for 
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 See generally Zeneca Ltd. v. Pharmachemie B.V., 16 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Mass. 
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 Id. at 113. 
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extension of the stay, was Eli Lilly and Company.109  The court found that 
generic defendant Zenith Goldline “failed to reasonably cooperate in 
expediting this action by failing to meet the case management deadline for 
serving its expert witness reports on the central issue of the case—
invalidity.”110  Under the case management plan, the expert reports were 
due ninety days before trial.111  Zenith Goldline was unable to produce the 
reports at that time, stating that the reports would be available 
approximately thirty days before trial.112  The court held that Zenith 
Goldline’s failure to meet  the discovery deadline for the expert reports 
was sufficient to trigger an extension of the statutory FDA stay because 
the reports were “on the critical path of this trial schedule.”113 
[29] In Eli Lilly v. Zenith Goldline, the Southern District of Indiana was 
the first court to hold that the modification provision of the Hatch-
Waxman Act applied to dilatory discovery tactics.114  The plaintiff, 
jurisdiction, and facts in Eli Lilly v. Zenith Goldline parallel the 
circumstances in the Eli Lilly v. Teva case.  A key difference between the 
cases, however, is that the Zenith Goldline court had previously granted 
Eli Lilly a motion based on Zenith Goldline’s discovery delays to continue 
the trial by approximately four months.115  Arguably, Zenith Goldline’s 
behavior was more severe, and its discovery delay was less excusable than 
Teva’s behavior in the more recent Eli Lilly v. Teva case. 
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4.  MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING CO. V. ALPHAPHARM PARTY LTD. 
[30] Minnesota Mining was another case where the generic defendant 
made evidentiary submissions after the deadlines for expert reports and 
discovery set forth in the scheduling order.116  The thirty-month stay had 
expired and the generic defendant Alphapharm was preparing to make an 
at-risk launch of its product.117  The pioneer plaintiff 3M filed motions 
both to extend the statutory thirty-month stay and for a preliminary 
injunction.118  The District of Minnesota denied both motions.119  The 
court held that Alphapharm’s submissions were “not untimely” due to “the 
complexity of the issues involved.”120  The court determined that, if 3M 
wanted to extend the statutory stay, 3M would have to seek and secure a 
preliminary injunction.121  3M’s motion for a preliminary injunction was 
denied because it could not establish irreparable harm.122  The court stated 
that any potential injury could be easily measured in monetary terms and 
remedied with money damages.123 
5.  ANDRX PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. V. BIOVAIL CORP. 
[31] In 2000, the Southern District of Florida ruled that generic 
defendant Andrx’s ANDA for a generic version of pioneer plaintiff 
Biovail’s drug Tiazac did not infringe Biovail’s patents.124  However, 
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before Andrx could market its drug, Biovail licensed a patent for an 
extended release formulation of the active ingredient in Tiazac and listed 
this new patent with the FDA.125  Biovail then filed suit against Andrx 
under the new patent, triggering a second thirty-month stay against 
Andrx’s ANDA.126  There was strong suspicion that Biovail’s second 
lawsuit was frivolous and that Biovail’s listing of the extended release 
formulation patent was a sham designed solely to use the thirty-month stay 
provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act to keep Andrx off the market.127 
[32] The Southern District of Florida transferred the second case as a 
related case to the same judge who had heard the first case.128  The district 
court decided that Biovail’s actions in listing the new patent were clearly 
“done to impede or delay the expeditious resolution of the patent actions,” 
and the court exercised its power under the modification provision to 
terminate Biovail’s second thirty-month statutory stay against Andrx’s 
ANDA.129  The court justified its authority under the modification 
provision stating, “[I]t is clear that this Court was given express authority 
in the Hatch-Waxman Act to police the Congressional compromise 
between patent protections for the pioneer drug maker and the public’s 
need for speedy approval of safe lower-cost generic equivalents to those 
drugs.”130  The Federal Circuit reversed,131 holding that the modification 
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provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act did not allow the district court to 
consider behavior before the FDA.132 
6.  NOVARTIS CORP. V. DR. REDDY’S LABS., LTD. 
[33] In Novartis v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, the Southern District of 
New York extended the thirty-month stay in conjunction with granting a 
motion by the generic defendant Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories to stay the 
litigation.133  The litigation involved the FDA’s stay of approval of one of 
the ingredients in an application for combination capsules with two drug 
ingredients that worked synergistically.134  The court found the 
defendant’s request to stay the litigation was warranted because it would 
simplify the issues and promote judicial economy, but that extension of 
the thirty-month stay on FDA approval of the combination drug product 
was necessary to ensure that pioneer plaintiff Novartis would not be 
disadvantaged by the delay in the litigation proceedings.135  The district 
court supported its determination to invoke the modification provision 
stating: “[Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories] cannot feasibly argue that it is 
reasonably cooperating in expediting the action when it has asked the 
court to stay the proceedings.”136  The decision was non-controversial.  
While the plaintiff objected to staying the litigation, the defendant did not 
object to tolling the thirty-month FDA stay while the infringement 
litigation was on hold.137 
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7.  ELI LILLY & CO. V. BARR LABORATORIES, INC.138 
[34] The Southern District of Indiana also granted Eli Lilly a limited 
extension of the statutory stay in Eli Lilly v. Barr Laboratories.139  In that 
case, the generic defendant Barr had failed to provide plaintiff Eli Lilly 
with a sample of its product.140  In its order, the court stated that it is 
“important, perhaps essential, that the composition of the generic drug 
product for which FDA approval is being sought . . . and which Lilly 
alleges to be the infringing product should be definitely established.”141  
The “order provided that, after the defendant produced the sample, the 
stay would extend through a reasonably expeditious time period for 
preparing for trial.”142  Most interestingly, Judge Sarah Evans Barker, the 
same judge who presided over and issued the statutory extension in Eli 
Lilly v. Teva, also issued the extension order in the Eli Lilly v. Barr 
case.143 
8.  DEY, L.P. V. IVAX PHARMS., INC. 
[35] The Central District of California is the only court, excluding the 
Southern District of Florida’s decision which was reversed by the Federal 
Circuit in Andrx, to grant a generic defendant’s motion to shorten the 
statutory thirty-month stay and to facilitate generic market entry.144  In 
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Dey v. Ivax, the Central District of California granted a motion to 
terminate the thirty-month stay145 based upon a finding that the pioneer 
plaintiff Dey, L.P. had failed to cooperate in expediting the litigation.146  
The court found that Dey had concealed studies comparing its product to a 
prior art drug and delayed its disclosure of the proper inventor of the 
patent at issue by repeatedly changing its position on inventorship.147  The 
court concluded that this behavior evidenced Dey’s failure to cooperate.148  
The district court later confirmed and further clarified its decision to 
terminate the statutory stay when it subsequently denied Dey’s motion for 
reconsideration.149  The court held that pioneer plaintiffs have a duty to 
form a good faith opinion on the issue of inventorship at the outset of 
litigation.150 
 There is nothing inconsistent about holding both (1) 
that Dey may seek to correct inventorship if new facts 
demonstrate a need to do so, and also (2) that Dey 
nevertheless should be required to inform itself of the facts 
underlying its claims of inventorship early in the action 
rather than waiting until the close of evidence at trial to 
discover the role played by each of its own current and 
former employees in the development of the patented 
material.151 
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In the opinion of the Central District of California, a pioneer plaintiff’s 
failure to take a solid position on inventorship is alone sufficient grounds 
for terminating the thirty-month statutory stay under the modification 
provision.152 
9.  IN RE BRIMONIDINE PATENT LITIGATION 
[36] The District of Delaware is a frequent venue for Hatch-Waxman 
litigations, but it has still never exercised its power to modify the statutory 
thirty-month stay.  Further, the District of Delaware has considered the 
modification provision only once.153  In that suit, pioneer plaintiff 
Allergan requested both to stay the litigation against generic defendant 
Exela PharmSci and to toll the thirty-month stay on FDA approval of 
Exela’s ANDA.154  Early in the litigation, Exela had joined Paddock and 
PharmaForce, two intended partners who were expected to manufacture 
Exela’s ANDA product, as defendants to the suit.155  Allergan brought its 
motion to stay the action without knowing Exela’s partnership with 
Paddock and PharmaForce had dissolved.156  Allergan argued that the 
litigation should be stayed because Exela’s ANDA designated Paddock as 
the manufacturer and PharmaForce had supplied most of the product 
bioequivalence information to the FDA.157  With respect to the thirty-
month FDA stay, Allergan argued that “Exela has: (1) failed to respond 
promptly to the FDA’s call for bioequivalence data; (2) suppressed 
relevant information; and (3) engaged in dilatory discovery tactics, all in 
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an effort to try to run the clock on Allergan.”158  The district court denied 
all of Allergan’s requests.159 
[37] The court stated that granting Allegan’s motion to stay the 
litigation would be “unduly prejudicial to Exela.”160  The court denied 
Allergan’s motion on the grounds that a stay would risk Exela’s first 
ANDA filer status (which entitled Exela to a 180-day market exclusivity 
period) and delay market entry of the generic product at issue in the 
litigation, rather than simplify any issues because the case was relatively 
far along.161  With respect to Allergan’s request to toll the thirty-month 
stay, the court was “not persuaded” that there was a “sufficient showing to 
support a finding that Exela [was] not reasonably cooperating in 
expediting this litigation” because the record did not “reflect the type of 
dilatory conduct and discovery antics that necessitate such a finding.”162  
The district court concluded that the problems associated with “Exela’s 
need to identify a new manufacturer, or conduct certain bioequivalence 
studies, or submit supplemental product information to the FDA” did not 
indicate failure to cooperate with expediting the litigation.163  The District 
of Delaware went on to add that “these types of issues are, and should be, 
a normal part of the give-and-take associated with the drug approval 
process,” before concluding that tolling the stay was not warranted based 
on the evidence before the court.164  This decision is particularly 
 
                                                                                                                         
158
 Id. at *10. 
159
 Id. at *12–13.  Allergan made a third request that the court grant it leave to use 
information produced by the generic defendants in the case in a citizen’s petition before 
the FDA.  The district court also denied this third request.  Id. at *12 (“It is just not 
apparent to this court why use of Exela’s confidential information is necessary.”). 
160
 Id. at *5. 
161
 Id. *6, 8–9. 
162
 Id. at *10. 
163
 Id. at *11. 
164
 Id. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology  Volume XVI, Issue 2 
29 
interesting because it occurred during the same week that the Southern 
District of Indiana reached its conflicting interpretation of the 
modification provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act in Eli Lilly v. Teva. 
IV.  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S ELI LILLY V. TEVA DECISION 
[38] The Federal Circuit’s holding in Eli Lilly v. Teva is potentially 
problematic precedent.  Currently, Eli Lilly v. Teva is only the second 
Federal Circuit decision concerning the modification provision of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.165  In Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit also confined 
Andrx v. Biovail, its prior decision concerning the modification provision, 
to Andrx’s unique procedural stance.166  The Eli Lilly decision is now the 
de facto case that parties will cite and to which the district courts will look 
when they consider motions under the Hatch-Waxman Act’s modification 
provision.  However, the Federal Circuit’s Eli Lilly v. Teva decision was 
unduly deferential to the district court.  The Federal Circuit’s decision fails 
to provide the district courts with guidance on how to conduct the 
“fail[ure] to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action” analysis 
required by the Act.167 
1.  THE MAJORITY HOLDING 
[39] The Federal Circuit’s Eli Lilly v. Teva decision was highly 
deferential to the district court.168  The court stated that trial courts may 
adjust the statutory thirty-month FDA stay based upon the uncooperative 
discovery practices of parties before the court.169  The Federal Circuit held 
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that it would only review district court decisions pursuant to the 
modification provision for an abuse of discretion.170   
[40] The Federal Circuit affirmed Andrx, holding that district courts 
may not extend the statutory stay based on filings before the FDA.171  But 
it also distinguished Andrx as a case in which the district court considered 
behavior wholly unrelated to the issue at hand, and as a situation that 
could no longer arise subsequent to the passage of the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments.172  The Federal Circuit determined that the district court’s 
decision to extend the stay was not based on Teva’s filing with the FDA 
but rather “Teva’s lack of cooperation in expediting the patent litigation in 
its court.”173  As such, the decision to extend the thirty-month FDA stay 
was a “proper application of the law.”174 
2.  JUDGE PROST’S DISSENT 
[41] In her dissent, Judge Prost argued that the majority both 
misapprehended the facts and misapplied the law.175  Prost argued that, 
because the issue was one of statutory construction, the court should have 
applied a de novo standard of review.176  However, Prost concluded that 
the district court’s decision needed to be overturned “even under an abuse 
of discretion standard.”177  Prost pointed out that the district court never 
made the necessary statutory finding: 
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 Not once in this order did the court indicate, much 
less unambiguously state, that it found Teva had failed to 
reasonably cooperate in expediting this action.  The court 
provided at most two justifications for extending the stay: 
(1) to provide Lilly a “sufficient opportunity to identify the 
nature and composition of the raloxifene product as Teva 
intends for it to be sold,” and (2) to give Lilly “a reasonable 
amount of time to allow its expert to test and report on the 
altered raloxifene samples provided by Teva and for Lilly 
to assess and utilize that information and analysis in 
preparation for trial.”  Neither of these reasons remotely 
resembles the statutorily required finding.178 
According to Prost, district court findings should clearly “relate[] [the 
party’s] conduct to the statutory standard,” and district court opinion’s 
must explain these findings with sufficient reasoning to provide for 
meaningful appellate review.179 
[42] Prost mentioned the consequences likely to arise from the 
majority’s opinion.  She reasoned that affirming the district court in this 
case would “effectively eliminate the statutorily required finding” and 
“prematurely terminate the development of appropriate standards 
governing modification under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).”180 
3.  THE MAJORITY OPINION PROVIDES INADEQUATE  
GUIDANCE TO THE DISTRICT COURTS 
[43] While the final outcome in Eli Lilly v. Teva is not necessarily 
incorrect, the majority opinion is highly problematic because it does not 
provide clear guidance on how to apply the modification provision of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.  The majority opinion was most likely correct to 
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conclude that the proper standard of review was abuse of discretion.181  
Further, it is not unthinkable that one might conclude, based on the 
evidence of Teva’s late discovery production, that Teva’s behavior met the 
statutory standard of failing to reasonably cooperate in expediting the 
action.  The problem with the Federal Circuit’s majority opinion is that it 
glossed over the fact that the district court never explicitly found that Teva 
failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action. 
[44] The Federal Circuit decision creates a risk that district courts will 
apply the modification provision to a wide variety of discovery failures, 
instead of only to severe discovery failures that meet the statutory 
standard.  The decision also creates the risk that future court modifications 
to the statutory stay period will lack significant correlation between the 
length of modification and the amount of delay caused. 
[45] The legislative history indicates that Congress had a reason for 
setting thirty months as the time length for the stay; Congress did not 
intend for the stay to remain in effect throughout the duration of every 
infringement trial.182 Congress wanted to provide generic manufacturers 
with the opportunity to launch at-risk following expiration of the stay.183  
In the absence of legislation clarifying the modification provision, the 
Federal Circuit has a duty to ensure that district court applications of the 
modification provision adhere to the terms of the statute.  The Federal 
Circuit should set precedent that, when faced with a motion under the 
modification provision, a district court must first evaluate whether a 
party’s behavior constitutes a failure to reasonably cooperate.  The district 
court must then determine whether this behavior resulted, or is likely to 
result, in delaying the trial.  Finally, upon satisfaction of both conditions, 
the district court must consider what length of modification is appropriate 
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to remedy the delay caused.  To allow modification of the thirty-month 
statutory stay using a more cursory analysis (such as the one used by the 
district court in Eli Lilly v. Teva) is dangerous because of the substantial 
real-world repercussions associated with the timing of the FDA’s approval 
of an ANDA. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
[46] The Federal Circuit’s decision in Eli Lilly v. Teva is problematic 
because it fails to provide the district courts with clear guidance on how to 
interpret and apply the modification provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  
Because it both affirmed the extension of a statutory FDA stay for a 
relatively minimal discovery delay and failed to delineate clear boundaries 
for the allowable use of the modification provision, the Federal Circuit’s 
Eli Lilly v. Teva decision is likely to result in a significant increase in the 
number of motions for modification of the statutory thirty-month stay on 
FDA approval of an ANDA.  Pioneer pharmaceutical plaintiffs, in 
particular, will now file greater numbers of motions to extend the statutory 
stay.  This increase in motions will spark a corollary increase in court 
decisions to shorten or extend the statutory thirty-month stay. 
[47] In the wake of Eli Lilly v. Teva, the district courts are likely to vary 
in their interpretations and applications of the modification provision.  
Some districts will be more liberal both in the frequency that they decide 
to modify statutory FDA stays and in the time durations for the FDA stay 
adjustments that they make.  Because of the large, real-world monetary 
value associated with the extension of a thirty-month FDA stay on ANDA 
approval, a lack of standardization amongst the district courts relating to 
their understanding and application of the modification provision could 
lead to significant forum shopping by pioneer pharmaceutical plaintiffs. 
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ADDENDUM 
Timeline of the Case History for  
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. 
2006 
May   
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. filed an ANDA with the FDA to 
manufacture and market generic raloxifene hydrochloride (which 
is sold by Eli Lilly under the brand name Evista). 
May 16 
 Teva notified Eli Lilly of its paragraph IV certification. 
June 29 
Eli Lilly and Company filed a lawsuit against Teva in the Southern 
District of Indiana alleging that Teva’s ANDA product infringed 
four Evista patents. 
The statutory thirty-month stay on FDA approval of Teva’s ANDA 
took effect. 
September 25 
The district court entered a scheduling order, setting a discovery 
deadline of August 18, 2008 and a trial date of March 9, 2009. 
December 
 Teva first provided Eli Lilly with a sample of its proposed ANDA 
product. 
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2007 
February 
Eli Lilly amended its complaint to assert that Teva infringed three 
additional patents related to raloxifene particle size and 
formulation. 
2008 
July 8 
Teva amended its ANDA with the FDA to include a new particle 
size measuring methodology for the active ingredient in its 
proposed raloxifene tablets. 
July 10 
 Teva informed Eli Lilly that it had amended its ANDA. 
July 28 
 Teva provided Eli Lilly with the first batch sample of its amended 
ANDA product. 
August 18 
 Original scheduled deadline for discovery. 
August 19 
 Teva provided Eli Lilly with the second batch sample of its 
amended ANDA product. 
September 5 
Teva provided Eli Lilly with the last of 27,000 pages of 
documentation related to its new particle size measuring 
methodology. 
September 17 
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 Teva provided Eli Lilly with the third batch sample of its amended 
ANDA product. 
Eli Lilly filed a motion requesting the extension of the statutory 
thirty-month stay prohibiting Teva from entering the market with 
its generic raloxifene product. 
October 6 
Eli Lilly filed motions for a temporary restraining order and a 
preliminary injunction (both motions were denied as moot). 
October 29 
The Southern District of Indiana granted Eli Lilly’s motion to 
extend the statutory FDA stay.  The stay on FDA approval was 
extended until the start of trial (March 9, 2009). 
November 16 
The original statutory thirty-month stay on FDA approval was set 
to expire.  Teva planned to launch at-risk on this date. 
2009 
February 24 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to extend 
the statutory stay until the start of trial. 
March 4 
The district court denied Eli Lilly’s request for an additional 
extension of the statutory stay on FDA approval. 
March 9 
 Trial began. 
The district court entered a temporary restraining order against 
Teva.  (Teva was planning at-risk launch even on the eve of trial.) 
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April 22 
The Southern District of Indiana granted a preliminary injunction 
in favor of Eli Lilly until a final trial determination is made. 
